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LABOR LAw-RAILWAY LABOR AcT-EFFECT OF CREATION OF
NATIONAL

RAILROAD

ADJUSTMENT

BOARD

ON

JURISDICTION

OF

CouRTs-The 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act1 (R.L.A.)
created the National Railroad Adjustment Board (N.R.A.B.) to hear
and decide disputes involving employee grievances and controversies
over application and interpretation of agreements, as distinguished from
disputes concerning making of collective agreements. Discussing disputes, over which the N.R.A.B. has jurisdiction, Justice Rutledge has
stated,
" [These disputes presuppose] the existence of a collective
agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which
no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to
create a new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or
proper application of a particular provision with reference to a
specific situation or to an omitted case. In the latter event the claim
is founded upon some incident of the employment relation, or
asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective agreement...." 2
148 Stat. L. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. U151 et seq. (1946).
2 Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 71 I at 723, 65 S.Ct. 1283 (1945).
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The extent to which courts have jurisdiction of these same disputes is
one of the still unsolved problems arising under the R.L.A. It is here
proposed to review the decisions on this question, and also the decisions
determining the jurisdiction of courts in matters previously submitted
to the N.R.A.B.
A. Alternative Resort
The R.L.A. section defining the jurisdiction of the N.R.A.B. is
phrased permissively.3 • \i\Thether this permits the claim to be presented
to the courts in the first instance, by-passing the N.R.A.B., involves two
questions: (I) whether the court has jurisdiction; and (2) whether the
court, although having jurisdiction, will refuse to hear the case because
it can be presented to the N.R.A.B. For convenience, the cases on each
question will be considered separately.
I. Jurisdiction

The effect of the R.L.A. on the jurisdiction of courts was an issue
presented to the Supreme Court in l\lI.oore v. Illinois Central R. Co.,4
decided in 1941. This was an action for damages for dismissal in violation of the collective agreement, a type of dispute of which the courts
had jurisdiction prior to the R.L.A. The Court held the act did not
make administrative proceedings a prerequisite to court action.
It would appear, however, that establishment of the N.R.A.B. has
decreased the jurisdiction of the federal courts insofar as granting injunctive relief is concerned, because section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act prohibits the granting of an injunction to a party who has"... failed
to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration."5 In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co.,6 the carrier and the union were
unable to agree on a contract after long negotiations, and the National
Mediauon Board had unsuccessfully attempted to mediate the dispute.
As the carrier had refused arbitration, the Court held that the requirements of section 8 had not been met, and that an injunction was ims 48 Stat. L. 1185, §3(i) (1934), 45 U.S.C., §l53(i) (1946): "The disputes between
••• employees and ••. carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretations or
application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions ••• shall be
handled in the usual manner ••• but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by .•• either party to the ••• Adjustment Board•••• "
4 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754 (1941).
5 47 Stat. L. 72, §8 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §108. "The term 'labor dispute' includes
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment••••" 47 Stat. L. 70, §l3(c)
(1932), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §ll3(c).
6 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413 (1944).
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properly granted the carrier. If arbitration of a dispute over the terms
of a proposed contract is a prerequisite to an injunction, it would seem
that submission to the N.R.A.B. of disputes within its cognizance would
also be necessary.
Three companion cases, decided in 1943, are important in determining the availability of judicial recourse under the R.L.A. 7 They
involved jurisdictional disputes between collective bargaining agents.
Although it was contended that the act conferred jurisdiction of such
disputes on the courts, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating in one case,

"In view of the pattern of this legislation and its history the
command of the Act should be explicit and the purpose to afford
a judicial remedy plain before an obligation enforcible in the
courts should be implied. Unless that test is met the assumption
must be that Congress fashioned a remedy available only in other
tribunals. "8
The Court has found that the R.L.A. bestows additional jurisdiction on the courts only when the act confers a right which will be lost
unless the courts have authority to grant relief. 9 This indicates that
concurrent jurisdiction with the N .R.A.B. does not extend beyond the
cases cognizable in the courts prior t9 the R.L.A., except where the act
7 Switchmen's Union v. Natl. Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 64 S.Ct. 95 (1943) (seeking review of the board's determination of the proper "craft or class" for the selection of the
bargaining representative); Genl. Committee' of Adjustment v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co., 320
U.S. 323, 64 S.Ct. 146 (1943) (seeking decisions on which of two competing unions had
jurisdiction under the R.L./\,. over "emergency engineers"); Genl. Committee of Adjustment
v. Southern Pacific Co., 320 U.S. 338, 64 S.Ct. 142 (1943) (seeking determination of which
union had jurisdiction under the R.L.A. to represent certain employees in presentation of
grievances before the earner).
s Genl. Committee of Adjustment v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co., 320 U.S. 323 at 337, 64
S.Ct. 146 (1943). Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 5th,
1947) 159 F. (2d) 822, where the carriers sought a judgment declaring the authority of the
union to- contract for alteration of an existing agreement, alleging a dispute within the union.
The court found no justiciable controversy.
9 Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S.Ct. 592 (1937) (no other
sanction available to enforce the right to bargain collectively). In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944),-the union discriminated against Negroes,
who were ineligible for membership, in contracting with the carrier. The Court found a·
statutory duty not to discriminate against non-members. There being no other remedy, since
the N .R.A.B. refused complaints of employees against unions, the Court held it had jurisdiction. The -same facts, except that diversity of citizenship was lacking, were present in
Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235 (1944). The Court held a federal
right was derived from _the duty imposed on the collective agent by the R.L.A. See also
.Order of Ry. Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 67 S.Ct. 405 (1947) where the two
divisions of the N.R.A.B; which might have had jurisdiction over yardmasters were deadlocked ·on the issue•. The.. ~urt "field it could remove this jurisdictional frustration on the
administrative level .and ·declared that yardmasters were under the fourth division. Followed
in Crowell v. Palmer, 134 · Conn.: 502, 58 A. (2d) 729 (1948) (union discriminating
against non-members).
·
·
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expressly so provides. In accord with this position, are the decisions
holding that in actions based on collective agreements the requirements
of diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount must still be met;
although the R.L.A. is an act regulating commerce, authorizing the
contracts and the N.R.A.B. proceedings thereon, such actions are not
suits arising under the R.L.A.10

2. Requirement of Prior Resort to the N.R.A.B.

In the Moore case,u an action for wrongful dismissal, the Court
held that the R.L.A. did not make administrative proceedings a prerequisite to a court action. Although reliance was placed on the permissive language of section 3, first (i),1 2 there was little discussion of the
issue. This rule has been applied in suits against the carrier for wrongful dismissal,1 3 for overtime pay,14 for penalty damages for breach of a
collective agreement,1 5 and in suits asserting seniority rights under the
collective contract.16
In 1946 the Supreme Court limited the doctrine of the Moore case,
in Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney.1·1 This was an action commenced by the O.R.C. in the bankruptcy court to have the court instruct its trustees and enjoin them from carrying out a contract made
with another union. The plaintiff union asserted that members of the
10 Schwartz v. South Buffalo R., (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 447; Southern Ry. Co.
v. Order of Ry. Conductors, (D.C. S.C. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 306; Strawser v. Reading Co.,
(D.C. Pa. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 455. Cf. Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct.
235 (1944), note 9, supra.
11 Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754 (1941).
12 ''The disputes •.. may be referred ••• by either party to the ••• Adjustment Board •.• .''
48 Stat. L. 1185, §3(i) (1934), 45 U.S.C. §l53(i) (1946).
1s Federal: Castle v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., (D.C. Ill. 1948) 15 C.C.H. LAB.
CAs. 1[ 64,650; Kelly v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., (D.C. Tenn. 1948) 15
C.C.H. LAB. CAs. ,r 64,746 (see note 47, infra); Beeler v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co.,
(C.C.A. 10th, 1948) 169 F. (2d) 557. State: Edelstein v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range
Ry. Co., 225 Minn. 508, 31 N.W. (2d) 465 (1948).
14 Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. McCombs, 143 Tex. 257, 183 S.W. (2d) 716 (1944).
15 Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1283 (1945),
rehearing, 327 U.S. 661, 66 S.Ct. 721 (1946).
1 6 Federal: Adams v. N.Y., Chi. & St. Louis R. Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1941) 121 F. (2d)
808. Contra, United States ex rel. Deavers v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1949)
16 C.C.H. LAB. CAs. 11 64,918, holding that the court could determine seniority rights, as
against the carrier, only because the Selective Service Act cut across the R.L.A., but that this
determination was not binding on the N.R.A.B. as against other employees. State: Evans v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 191 Ga. 395, 12 S.E. (2d) 61 I (1940); cf. Tharp v. Louisville
& N. R. Co., 307 Ky. 322, 210 S.W. (2d) 954 (1948), where the court refused a mandatory injunction on the ground that this extraordinary remedy was not available when administrative remedies exist, and declined to pass on the lower court's finding that, under the
R.L.A., it had jurisdiction of suits asserting seniority rights.
11 326 U.S. 561, 66 S.Ct. 322 (1946).
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O.R.C. were entitled to certain jobs under their contract with the
carrier and would be displaced by enforcement of the other contract.
Although finding that the trustees could properly be instructed, the
Court held that the injunction was improperly issued insofar as it purported to determine the rights of the unions under their respective contracts to the three jurisdictional dispute cases18 and the labor injunction
case,19 stating that those decisions indicated the R.L.A. "intended to
leave a minimum responsibility to the courts."20 Pointing out that the
case involved more than a mere construction of a document, that it concerned two contracts, custom, usage, and intricate technical facts, the
Court held that its equitable discretion should be exercised to give the
N.R.A.B. fast opportunity to pass on the issue. Proceedings were
ordered stayed to allow application to the N.R.A.B. for interpretation
of the agreements.
Although the .Moore case was not referred to in the Pitney case,
the decision delivered two months later in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry.
Co. v. Burley21 seems ·to indicate that the Court had no intention of
overruling it. In the Burley case, suit was brought by employees for
penalty damages for violation of the starting time provisions of the
collective contract. Only the individual claims were involved, since the
carrier and the union had agreed on the starting time for future operations. The issue was whether the employees were bound by an adverse
award in N.R.A.B. proceedings prosecuted by the :union. The Court
held that this would require a grant of actual authority to the union
from the employees and remanded the case for a finding on this question. Neither the Moore nor the Pitney case was mentioned, nor was
there any indication that the employees must first present their claims
to the N .R.A.B.
The decisions discussing the Pitney case are not agreed on its scope.
The appellate division of New York found that it was merely a decision
on the dual capacity of the court,22 and affirmed a judgment on the
18 Note 7, supra.
19 Brotherhood of

Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co., 321 U.S.
50, 64 S.Ct. 413 (1944).
20 326 U.S. 561 at 566, 66 S.Ct. 322 (1946).
21 327 U.S. 661, 66 S.Ct. 721 (1946), on rehearing, affirming, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct.
J283 (1945).
22 " ••• [T]he court might act in two distinct capacities. First, it might do so in the
capacity of a 'judicial body' in the possession of the business, or a carrier within the meaning
of § I of the Railway Labor Act...•
"Finally, to settle the dispute the reorganization court would have to act in the further
capacity of a tribunal empowered to grant the equitable relief sought..•." Order of Railway
Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 at 565, 66 S.Ct. 322 (1946).
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merits in a suit identical to the Pitney case except that it was commenced
by the carrier seeking a declaratory judgment.23 The South Carolina
court indicated that complexity of issues is the controlling factor in determining when prior resort to the N .R.A.B. must be made; the court assumed jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action seeking construction
of a single contract in a dispute between one union and a carrier.24
Some federal courts have considered the Pitney decision as applicable to jurisdictional disputes between unions, but these decisions all involved asserted conflicting contract rights against the carrier and re- ·
quests for injunctive relief. 25 These federal decisions, therefore, do not
extend beyond the facts of the Pitney case.
There has been disagreement among the federal courts, however, as
to the meaning of the Pitney case. In Hunter v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe R. Co., 26 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to
enjoin enforcement of an award which would permanently displace
the complainants, Negro porters, from their jobs. The Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, representing a different "craft or class" of employees, claimed the jobs under its contract with the carrier and received an award in N.R.A.B. proceedings of which the complainants
had had no notice. The court held that the award was void for want
of due process and that it wrongfully deprived the complainants of
their property interest in the jobs. The Pitney case was distinguished
on the ground that a labor dispute was not involved, and that the court
was not adjudicating the rights of the parties but merely declaring the
board's order to be void, leaving the parties free to follow any appropriate procedure to determine their rights.27
In Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. New Orleans, Texas & Mexico R. Co.,28 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with
the same problem, except that the complaining union had been denied
leave to intervene in the N.R.A.B. proceedings. The court applied the
Pitney case and refused to enjoin enforcement of the award, presenting
23 Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co. v. Slocum, 274 App. Div. 950, 83 N.Y.S.
(2d) 513 (1948). Prior to the Pitney case, this court held it had jurisdiction of the dispute,
relying on the Moore decision; 269 App. Div. 467, 57 N.Y.S. (2d) 65 (1945).
24 Southern Ry. Co. v. Order of Railway Conductors, 210 S.C. 121, 41 S.E. (2d) 774
(1947).
25 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. New Orleans, Tex. & Mex. Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 8th,
1946) 156 F. (2d) l; Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co. v. Randolph, (C.C.A. 8th, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 4;
Hampton v. Thompson, (C.C.A. 5th, 1948) 171 F. (2d) 535.
20 (C.C.A. 7th, 1948) 171 F. (2d) 594.
27 The labor injunction case, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria &
Western R. Co., 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413 (1944), was distinguished on the same ground.
2s (C.C.A. 8th, 1946) 156 F. (2d) I.
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two answers to the due process argument: (I) the complainant had no
right to intervene in the N.R.A.B. proceedings, since the N.R.A.B.
did not have power to decide jurisdictional disputes between unions;
apparently, the court thus declared that the award did not determine
the rights of the complainant; (2) until the complainant's contract was
interpreted by the N.R.A.B., in a proceeding against. the carrier, the
court would not know whether the complainant had any rights which
would be violated by the displacement of its members by the award.29
As the Pitney case does not clearly define the extent to which the
Supreme Court will apply the doctrine of prior resort (that administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort to the courts), reference to other fields in which the doctrine was developed may be helpful. The Interstate Commerfe Act gave to the railroads' customers
the right to recover from the railroads damages for violations of the act,
and gave them the option of making complaint to the commission or
suing in the district courts.30 One vvriter, in an informative article considering the development of the doctrine of prior resort in this field,
concludes that the cases which must be presented to the commission
for decision are tho,se involving its quasi-legislative, rule-making power.
If the case involves purely judicial determinations, it may be presented
to the courts.31 Other writers suggest that the doctrine is also applied
to take advantage of the expert determinations which administrative
agencies can make.32 Although the N.R.A.B. has onlv quasi-judicial
powers, some of its decisions have almost the effect of rulings determining the future operation of the carrier respecting the matters decided. If, in such cases, and in those demanding technical knowledge,
it were required that the matter be first presented to the N.R.A.B.,
the practice would be brought in harmony with that in analogous
fields. This would reserve to the courts cases involving no more than
adjudication of individual claims in which technical contract questions
are not involved. It is submitted that, in view of the approach taken by
the Supreme Court in the three jurisdictional dispute cases,33 this may be
thP nroper scope of the Pitney decision.
The doctrine of prior resort is essentially a doctrine of judicial self29Relied on as authority in Hampton v. Thompson, (C.C.A. 5th, 1948) 171 F. (2d)
535, which also held that r~ort to the N.R.A.B. was not excused merelv because the complaining union was composed of Negroes and the labor members of the N.R.A.B. were selected by
unions which denied membership to Negroes.
30 24 Stat. L. 379, 382, §§8, 9 (1887), 49 U.S.C. (1946) ~§8, 9.
31 McAllister, "Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders," 28 CALIF.
L. REv. 129 at 143-151 (1940).
.
3 2 Berger, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies,'' 48 YALE L. J. 981 (1939); 51
HARV. L. REv. 1251 at 1261 (1938).
·
33 Note 7, supra.
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restraint which attempts to achieve the legislative policies by leaving
certain matters to administrative agencies. Two objectives of the R.L.A.
are :µninterrupted commerce and prompt settlement of grievances.34 •
The N.R.A.B. has a large backlog of cases, chiefly attributable to the
first division.35 This prevents prompt settlement of disputes, not only
threatening,36 but recently resulting in a strike interrupting commerce.37 This situation may well operate as a deterrent to full application of the doctrine of prior resort in R.L.A. cases.

B. Effect of Resort to the N.R.A.B.
The courts have had considerable difficulty in determining the scope
of their power when an award, other than one for money, has been rendered by the N.R.A.B.38 Two sections of the R.L.A. are pertinent:
(1) section 3, first (m), declaring the effect of an award;39 (2 )section 3, first (p), providing for enforcement of an award against the
carrier.40
34 48 Stat. L. 1185, §2 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §152 (1946).
s;; Of 2590 cases before the N.R.A.B. which were open at the end of the fiscal year
of 1947, 2321 were in the first division. During this same period, 702 cases were decided by
the first division. 13nt ANN. REP. OF NATL. MEDIATION Bo., for the Fiscal Year Ended June
30, 1947, p.57, table 15 (1948).
30 "Employee organizations, dissatisfied with long delays, have resorted to other techniques in securing settlements. Some of the organizations have withdrawn cases pending before the Division and have declined to submit new cases, preferring to achieve settlements
by direct negotiations. When such negotiations fail, strikes are sometimes threatened • • •
In such cases the Mediation Board • • • proffers mediation service. • • • Of particular importance to the Mediation Board is the fact that time spent on mediation cases of this kind
is at the expense of regular mediation cases. The rise in the number of pending cases on the
Board's docket during the past year is largely due to the necessity of using a considerable
amount of mediator time in efforts to settle disputes that properly should be referred to the
First Division." 13TH ANN. REP. OF NATL. MEDIATION Bo., for Fiscal Year Ended June 30,
1947, p.5 (1948).
37 The strike of the operating brotherhoods against the Wabash Railroad, begun on
March 15, 1949, was called because of inability to reach an agreement on accumulated
grievances. N.Y. HERALD-TRIBUNE 42:2 (March 16, 1949).
38 See the following cases, holding that under section 3, first (m) and (p), notes 39
and 40, infra, the entire dispute may be reexamined. Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry., (D.C.
Iowa 1936) 16 F. Supp. 810; Swift v. Chicago, North Western Ry. Co., (D.C. Iowa 1944)
8 C.C.H. LAB. CAs.1(62,030; Southern Pacific Co. v. Joint Council Dining Car Employees,
(C.C.A. 9th, 1947) 13 C.C.H. LAB. CAs. ,r64, 175.
30 48 Stat. L. 1185 §3 (m) (1934), 45 U.S.C. §153 (m) (1946): " ••• the awards shall
be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a
money award."
40Jd. §3(h), §153(h): "If a carrier does not comply with an order of ••• the Adjustment Board . • • the petitioner • • • may file in the District Court • • • a petition setting
forth • • • the causes for which he claims relief • • • • Such suit • • • shall proceed in all
respects as other civil suits, except that • • • the findings and order of the • • • Adjustment
Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the petitioner
shall not he liable for costs • • • . If the petitioner shall prevail he shall be allowed a
reasonable attorney's fee .••• The district courts are empowered ••• to enforce or set
aside the order of the • • • Adjustment Board."
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Only two such judicial decisions were found involving awards in
favor of the employee.41 One was Dahlberg v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
R. Co., 42 a suit to enforce the award which protected the employee's
seniority rights. The court held that subsection (p) contemplated review on the merits, despite the provision in subsection (m) that the
award was "£nal and binding"; £nding the award erroneous, the court
set it aside. The other case, Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell,43
was a declaratory judgment action brought by the carrier to have the
dispute redecided and the award set aside. The court held that the action could not be brought until the two year period for enforcement
of the award had expired, since this action would deprive the employees
of the advantages given them in a suit for enforcement.
The only cases found involving an award in favor of the carrier,
and against the employee, are those in which the award was pleaded
as a defense to an independent court action asserting the same claim.
Only one such case has reached the Supreme Court, namely, Elgin,
Joliet &-Eastern R. Co. v. Burley. 44 The claim was for penalty damages for past violations of the starting time agreement, and an unsuccessful N.R.A.B. proceeding had been prosecuted by the union. The
Court disposed of the case by £nding that the R.L.A. did not give
the union statutory authority to represent the employee in the presentation· of already vested claims. It was held that the lower court must
£rst decide whether the union had been given such authority by the
employee, before the question of £nality of the award should be decided. Four justices dissented, on the ground that under the R.L.A.
the union had such authority and that £nality of the award was the
issue before the Court. Referring to comparable provisions governing
reparations orders by the Interstate Commerce Commission,45 they believed that the same treatment should be accorded awards of the
N.R.A.B., and that this award against the employee, not being for
money, barred redress in the courts. Other courts, though having diffi.41 ''Theoretically, the railroads do not need to comply with an award until an action is
brought in court to enforce the award. The theory does not accord with the fact however. Of
about 5,000 awards that the Board has made to date, not more than a half dozen enforcement
proceedings in court have been brought, and yet the great preponderance of the awards have
been complied with." Atty. Genl.'s Committee on Admin. Proc. Ry. Lab. Monograph 17,
p. 13 (1940); }ONES, NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD 233 (1941).
42 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 121.
43 (App. D.C. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 235, affd. by equally divided court, 319 U.S. 732, 63
S.Ct. 1430 (1943).
44 327 U.S. 661, 66 S.Ct. 721 (1946), on rehearing, affg. 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1283
(1945).
45 34 Stat. L. 584, §5 (1906), 49 U.S.C. §16(1) (2) (1946).
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culty with the question, have held in every case found, that the adverse
award precludes an independent court action.46
Only one case was found in which the court action was commenced
after submission of the claim to the N.R.A.B., but prior to the rendering of an award. The court held the R.L.A. clearly contemplated that
this election of remedies precluded recourse to the court.47
Thus it may be said that while the effect of creation of the N.R.A.B.
on the jurisdiction of the courts over disputes which may be or have
been submitted to the board is not completely settled, the cases indicate a tendency toward administrative finality. Although the judicial
self-restraint exhibited by the courts may be limited by practical considerations, such as the backlog of cases pending before the N .R.A.B.,
this tendency seems to be in accord with the trend of Supreme Court
decisions in other fields.

Frank L. Adamson, S. Ed.

46 Austin v. Southern Pacific Co., 50 Cal. App. (2d) 292, 123 P.(2d) 39 (1942);
Berryman v. Pullman Co., (D.C. Mo. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 542; Hargis v. Wabash R. Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 163 F.(2d) 608; Williams v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 356
Mo. 967, 204 S.W.(2d) 693 (1947); Ramsey v. Chesapeake & Ohio R., (D.C. Ohio 1948)
75 F. Supp. 740; Hicks v. Thompson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 207 S.W.(2d) 1000.
47 Kelly v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., (D.C. Tenn. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 737.
Summary judgment was withdrawn, however, on showing that submission to the N.R.A.B.
was subsequent to commencing the court action and that the N.R.A.B. had declined to hear
the case on this ground. (D.C. Tenn. 1948) 15 C.C.H. LAB. CAs. ,r64, 746.

